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In the last few decades, Congress has passed a variety of statutes to 
improve legal protections for federal employee-whistleblowers, with the dual 
goals of promoting disclosure of wrongdoing and prohibiting retaliation 
against whistleblowers. However, these statutes and goals were undermined 
during the Trump administration. This Article argues that President Trump’s 
administration conducted multi-faceted attacks against federal employee-
whistleblowers in order to deter disclosure of the administration’s 
wrongdoing. Since these efforts began, there has been a decrease in 
whistleblower disclosures of wrongdoing in the federal government. In order 
to stop this trend, immediate action is needed, including amending federal 
laws to reduce the possibility of retaliation by administration officials against 
whistleblowers, increasing funding and staffing at the federal agencies 
tasked with protecting whistleblowers and adjudicating their retaliation 
claims, and promoting greater outreach by congressional committees to 
federal employees within agencies over which such committees have 
oversight authority. If these steps are not taken, there is a significant risk that 
the culture of promoting whistleblowing that has been cultivated within the 
federal government will collapse, leaving the American public in the dark 
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President Trump’s administration produced a surfeit of high-profile 
whistleblowers. Ranging from the whistleblower who jumpstarted the House 
of Representative’s investigation into the Ukraine scandal to the 
whistleblower who brought allegations of Russian bounties on American 
troops to light, these individuals illustrate the increasing importance of 
whistleblowing in the public sector as well as the lack of adequate protections 
for whistleblowers. As to the former, it is quite possible that without the 
individual who reported the call with the Ukrainian president, there would 
have been no impeachment of President Trump. And as to the latter, 
traditional protections for whistleblowers, which focus on preventing the 
agency in which the whistleblower works from retaliating against that 
whistleblower, are inadequate to protect whistleblowers in the federal 
government. Indeed, the steps President Trump and his administration took 
to quell whistleblowers have undermined the whistleblower protection 
system. Unless protections for whistleblowers are strengthened, and the 




culture of antagonism to whistleblowers changes, it is likely that the number 
of public sector whistleblowers will drop, which may have catastrophic 
effects on the viability of our democracy.   
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will outline the 
development of whistleblower protections for federal government employees 
and the current state of these protections. Part II will expose how the Trump 
administration undermined these protections in myriad ways, including 
outright ignoring the prohibitions on retaliation against whistleblowers, 
increasing resources devoted to investigating and prosecuting employees 
who disclose wrongdoing to the press, threatening and encouraging others to 
threaten whistleblowers on social media, and under-funding and -staffing the 
federal agencies responsible for assisting whistleblowers and adjudicating 
their retaliation claims. Part III proposes solutions to mitigate the damage in 
order to restore the whistleblowing promotion and protection culture within 
the federal government. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE-WHISTLEBLOWER SYSTEM 
 
Legal protections for whistleblowers began more than a century ago 
with concerns about protecting the government. As early as the Civil War, an 
early form of whistleblower encouragement was enacted to battle against 
fraud by government contractors.1 Fast-forward a century, and the federal 
government developed the blueprint for current whistleblower protections 
throughout the country. The contours of protections for federal employees, 
the importance of whistleblowers within the federal government, and the 
trends in whistleblower disclosure and retaliation are discussed below. 
 
A. Development of Whistleblower Protections for Government Employees  
 
Modern protections for government whistleblowers began with the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). As stated in the Act: 
 Employees should be protected against reprisal for the 
lawful disclosure of information which the employees 
reasonably believe evidences— 
 (A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or 
 (B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse 
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
health or safety.2 
 
1 See NANCY M. MODESITT, JANIE F. SCHULMAN & DANIEL P. WESTMAN, 
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ch. 1, at 4–5 (3d ed. 2015) 
(describing the evolution of whistleblower protections in the United States). 
2 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 2301(b)(9), 92 Stat. 1111, 1114 (1978).  
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The Civil Service Reform Act also created the Office of Special 
Counsel (OSC), which is an independent entity that promotes whistleblowing 
within the federal government and protects whistleblowers against reprisal.3 
In addition to the authority given to the Special Counsel to investigate 
retaliation allegations,4 the Special Counsel is also tasked with bringing 
disciplinary proceedings against those who engaged in such retaliation.5 
That same year that Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act, 
Congress also created a secondary system to promote whistleblowing within the 
federal government by enacting the Inspector General Act. The Inspectors 
General were tasked with conducting audits of their agencies, investigating fraud 
and abuse, and reporting on these to Congress and the head of their agencies.6    
Putting together the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act and the 
Inspector General Act, federal employees who wanted to report wrongdoing in 
the government could take a variety of approaches: (1) they could report 
wrongdoing within their governmental unit; (2) they could report wrongdoing 
to OSC; and/or (3) they could report wrongdoing to their agency’s Inspector 
General. Regardless of the approach taken, the CSRA was supposed to protect 
them from retaliation. However, limitations in the initial statute, as well as 
subsequent court decisions interpreting the statute, made it difficult for some 
whistleblowers to receive the promised protection against retaliation.7  
Recognizing this, Congress has acted twice since the enactment of the 
Civil Service Reform Act to significantly enhance protections for 
whistleblowers. First, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 substantially 
modified the provisions of the CSRA to better protect whistleblowers.8 It 
created an independent right of action for federal employee whistleblowers 
who had suffered from retaliation, rather than forcing them to rely upon OSC 
to pursue their claims.9 It also lowered the causation standard, allowing 
whistleblower claims to succeed so long as the whistleblower could establish 
 
3 For a detailed history of the OSC and its role in supporting federal employee-
whistleblowers, see Bruce D. Fong, Whistleblower Protection and the Office of Special 
Counsel: The Development of Reprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1015 (1991). 
4 5 U.S.C. § 1214. 
5 Id. § 1215. Interestingly, this provision shows that Congress was clearly concerned about 
political appointees retaliating against federal workers. Id. Section (b) provides for the 
Special Counsel to submit reports of such retaliation to the President. Id. Apparently, 
Congress did not envision the current scenario where the President would be the one 
spearheading the retaliation charge. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
6 Civil Service Reform Act §§ 2, 4. 
7 See MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, at ch. 8, § A, at 3–13 (discussing the development of 
the CSRA). 
8 Id. § 8-4. 
9 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). For the individual right of action provision, 
see 5 U.S.C. § 1221. 




that their protected disclosure of information was a contributing factor in 
action taken against them.10 In order to further protect whistleblowers against 
retaliation, Congress also prohibited OSC from disclosing the identity of 
whistleblowers except in extremely limited circumstances.11  
While these changes were beneficial to whistleblowers, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals limited the scope of these protections through its 
interpretations of the statutory scheme.12 As a result, several decades later, 
the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) was passed 
to reverse many of these interpretations of the law. For example, the WPEA 
reversed decisions that had eliminated protections for whistleblowers who 
made disclosures as part of their job duties.13 It also broadened the scope of 
protected activities to include any disclosure made in connection with an 
OSC investigation, not just those made by the primary whistleblower.14    
As might be evident from this brief overview, the trend in this area of 
the law has been to increase legal protections for federal employee-
whistleblowers against retaliation. This increased protection recognizes the 
importance of whistleblowing within the federal government, which is 
discussed below. 
 
B. Importance of Whistleblowing in the Federal Government and Disturbing 
Trends in Whistleblowing Data 
 
Whistleblowing is a critically important method of uncovering 
wrongdoing within any organization. Indeed, one study indicated that 
whistleblowing is the primary method for organizations to detect fraud.15 As 
the head of OSC, Special Counsel Kerner emphasized the importance of 
whistleblowers in the federal government, saying: “[w]histleblowers are our 
front-line in rooting out fraud and wrongdoing at all levels of government.”16 
Within the federal government, whistleblowers have uncovered gross waste 
 
10 5 U.S.C. § 1214 (containing the “contributing factor” standard). 
11 MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, § 8-4. 
12 Id. § 8-7. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See W. Michael Hoffman & Mark S. Schwartz, The Morality of Whistleblowing: A 
Commentary on Richard T. De George, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 771, 771–73 (2015) (discussing 
existing research on the topic); Muel Kaptein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: 
The Influence of the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed 
Wrongdoing, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 513–16 (2011) (discussing the importance of 
whistleblowers in detecting organizational wrongdoing). 
16 Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner Statement on National Whistleblower Appreciation Day, 
U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. (July 30, 2019), https://osc.gov/News/Pages/19-13-Special-
Counsel-Whistleblower-Appreciation-Day.aspx [https://perma.cc/GL45-SGL4]. 
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that has cost millions of dollars,17 violations of safety standards that are 
designed to protect the public,18 and potentially unlawful or corrupt behavior 
at the highest levels of government.19    
Despite the obvious importance of whistleblowers in the federal 
government, it is impossible to determine the precise number of 
whistleblowers in the federal government. This is because there is no entity 
that centrally records allegations by whistleblowers. While many federal 
employees do have an option to report wrongdoing to the OSC, the entity 
tasked with protecting whistleblowers, there is no requirement that they do 
so. Thus, some employees will report wrongdoing to OSC, while others will 
work within their own agency to report wrongdoing, such as by contacting 
the Inspector General for their agency.  
The figures on whistleblowing that are obtainable are numbers of 
employees who report wrongdoing outside of their agency by bringing it to 
the attention of OSC through a whistleblower disclosure report. Beyond that, 
one must extrapolate from the number of retaliation claims filed, where an 
employee alleges that they reported wrongdoing and suffered adverse 
consequences as a result.  
Since fiscal year (FY) 2006, the number of whistleblower disclosures 
made to OSC increased significantly over time until FY 2015. In FY 2006, 
there were only 435 whistleblower disclosures made to OSC.20 As of FY 
2008, the number had only modestly increased, by approximately one 
hundred disclosures.21 However, between FY 2008 and FY 2012, the total 
number of disclosures rose steeply, reaching 1,148 in FY 2012.22 The peak 
number of whistleblower disclosures to OSC was reached in FY 2015, in 
which OSC received 1,965 disclosures.23 Since then, the number has 
 
17 VA Wasted $223 Million on Transport Services, Failed to Pay Veterans’ Medical Bills 
Resulting in Denied Care, U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://osc.gov/ 
News/Pages/20-07-VA-Wasted-223-Million.aspx [https://perma.cc/J669-US8G]. 
18 OSC Obtains $90K in Damages for Whistleblower Retaliated Against After Disclosing 
Unqualified Flight Safety Inspectors, U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://osc.gov/ 
News/Pages/20-11-Damages-for-Whistleblower-Flight-Safety-Inspectors.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/BYQ7-PSLC].  
19 See infra Sections II.A–C (detailing the retaliation against whistleblowers who have 
disclosed wrongdoing in the Trump administration). 
20 2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27. For the purposes of this Article, all 
numbers of disclosures refer to disclosures made in a particular fiscal year, not the total 
number of disclosures that OSC handled in a fiscal year. The total number of disclosures 
handled in a fiscal year is higher than the total number of disclosures made to the agency 
because some matters are carried over from one fiscal year to the next.   
21 Id.  
22 2013 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 36. 
23 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27. 




fluctuated, but mainly declined, with 1,559 whistleblower disclosures in FY 
2018 and 1,373 in FY 2019.24   
Whistleblower disclosures only reveal a partial picture of actual 
whistleblowing that occurs within federal agencies. As noted above, some 
employees elect not to make a disclosure to OSC, and instead work within 
their agency to disclose wrongdoing. These situations are not captured by the 
whistleblower disclosure data. However, a portion of these situations do 
come to OSC’s attention—specifically, when a whistleblower files a claim 
with OSC that they have been retaliated against for having blown the whistle. 
As to these retaliation claims, it appears that the number is higher than the 
number of whistleblowing disclosures and has increased in recent years.25 In 
FY 2006, up to 1,805 PPP complaints26 were made to OSC. That number 
steadily rose and by FY 2012, the Office of Special Counsel received 2,969 
complaints,27 an increase of approximately 1,100 since FY 2006.28 By FY 
2018, that number had increased significantly again, growing to its highest 
level ever, at 4,168.29 
 
24 Id. 
25 OSC tracks the number of retaliation complaints as part of the broader group of “prohibited 
personnel practices” (PPPs) that include some matters that do not involve retaliation. OSC 
does not disaggregate the data on PPPs; thus, the best approximation we have on the trends 
in retaliation complaints is based on this number of PPP complaints filed. Throughout the 
passage below, the term “PPP complaint” references these PPP complaints. 
26 2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 17; see also id. at 12 (referring to 
“whistleblower retaliation” claims—along with claims for retaliation for exercising an 
appeal right, due process violations, other legal violations, and marital discrimination—as 
“prohibited personnel practice complaints”).  
27 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16. Annual reports from the Merit System 
Protection Board (MSPB) also provide some information about the number of whistleblower 
retaliation claims brought by federal employees. See 2019–2021 U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 
ANN. PERFORMANCE REP. & ANN. PERFORMANCE PLAN 51 (detailing petitions for review 
relating to whistleblower appeals for FY 2019). The number of initial whistleblower appeals 
in 2019, filed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and (9), was 691. Id. There were also eight-seven 
refiled whistleblower appeals and eleven cases remanded which, if included, would put the 
grand total of whistleblower cases filed with the MSPB last year at 789. Id. However, these 
cases represent only a portion of the total number of cases that involve claims of retaliation 
because of the different ways in which retaliation claims can be filed. The above numbers 
represent claims filed as an individual right of action—all of which are whistleblowing 
claims. A claim involving whistleblowing could also be filed as an appeal of a dismissal for 
performance reasons, which would not necessarily be captured in the MSPB’s data as a 
whistleblowing claim. Furthermore, an undeterminable number of these MSPB claims will 
involve matters previously brought to OSC’s attention. Thus, the number of MSPB claims is 
both over- and under-inclusive of the number of whistleblowers in the federal government 
and seems less accurate than the OSC figures.    
28 See 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (summarizing the number of complaints 
from FY 2012 to FY 2019).   
29 Id. 
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Two central points emerge from this information on rates of 
whistleblowing. First, regardless of the metric used (whistleblower 
disclosures or retaliation claims filed), whistleblowing behavior had been 
increasing in the federal government up until around 2015.30 The growth in 
the number of whistleblowers could be the result of a number of factors. First, 
it could reflect an increase in the confidence of whistleblowers that they 
would not face retaliation, or that if they did, retaliation would be mitigated 
when they filed a claim with OSC. Support for this hypothesis is found in the 
transformation of OSC between the George W. Bush administration and the 
Obama administration. The Special Counsel appointed by Bush was widely 
viewed as ineffective and not supportive of whistleblowers.31 Indeed, he 
ultimately plead guilty to criminal contempt of Congress when he removed 
information from OSC computers that would have revealed his refusal to 
protect federal employees under his office’s mandate.32 This changed 
dramatically under the Obama administration,33 where the Special Counsel was 
so well-regarded that even a number of Republicans advocated for her retention 
after President Obama left office.34 Supporting this hypothesis, whistleblower 
disclosure numbers were fairly stagnant between FY 2006 and FY 2008,35 with 
an increase of about fifty each year. Special Counsel Scott Bloch announced his 
resignation one month into FY 2009,36 and in FY 2009, the number of 
 
30 See id. (showing increasing number of retaliation claims until FY 2015); 2012 U.S. OFF. 
SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (showing increasing number of retaliation claims from FY 
2007 to FY 2012, with the exception of a slight decrease between FY 2009 and FY 2010); 
id. at 31 (showing increasing number of whistleblower disclosures from FY 2007 to FY 
2012, with numbers of disclosures more than doubling in that interval, with the exception of 
a slight decrease in disclosures from FY 2010 to FY 2011). 
31 See Joe Davidson, Workers Applaud Special Counsel’s Return to Private Sector, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/21/ 
AR2008102102572.html [https://perma.cc/7CVH-3CKF] (noting comments by workers’ 
organizations and federal employees that the office failed to support whistleblowers). 
32 Spencer S. Hsu, Head of Bush Administration’s Whistle-Blower Protection Office Faces 
Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2011/02/03/AR2011020306810.html [https://perma.cc/3WWW-AYLH]. 
33 See Joe Davidson, Under Carolyn Lerner, Special Counsel Office is Doing Its Job Now, 
Observers Say, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/under-carolyn-lerner-special-counsel-office-is-doing-its-job-now-observers-say/2012/ 
06/28/gJQApX229V_story.html [https://perma.cc/77WB-5MLA] (discussing workers’ 
positive reactions to and whistleblower advocates’ praise for OSC’s new head). 
34 See Joe Davidson, Special Counsel Lerner Leaves Office as Trump Rejects Highly Praised 
Whistleblower Advocate, WASH. POST (June 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/06/07/lerner-leaves-office-of-special-counsel-as-trumps-
rejects-highly-praised-whistleblower-advocate/ [https://perma.cc/CA9Y-NDJT] (noting 
support for the retention of Carolyn Lerner among Republicans). 
35 2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27. 
36 See Davidson, supra note 31 (discussing Bloch’s announcement of his resignation). 




whistleblower disclosures jumped by nearly 200 reports.37 Taken together, the 
timing of Special Counsel Bloch’s resignation and the sharp increase in 
whistleblower disclosures could be read to support this hypothesis.  
Another potential reason for the increase in the number of 
whistleblowers could be an increase in the behavior subject to 
whistleblowing. There is also support for this position in the data. During FY 
2014, there was a large spike in whistleblower disclosures, with 
approximately 400 more disclosures than were made in the previous year.38 
There was another large increase in FY 2015 of approximately 400 
disclosures.39 OSC does not report the agency where the disclosing employee 
worked, but it appears likely that at least some of these disclosures were 
related to a major scandal at the Department of Veterans Affairs. In early 
2014, significant problems had been exposed in the provision of medical 
services to veterans.40 And while OSC does not disclose the agency for whom 
employees making whistleblower disclosures worked, there is evidence that 
some employees at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) did report 
wrongdoing and were retaliated against.41 Between FY 2013 and FY 2014, 
the number of PPP complaints made by employees at the Department of 
Veterans Affairs increased by approximately 500.42 Between FY 2014 and 
FY 2015, the number of these complaints increased again by approximately 
600.43 The number of these PPP complaints then leveled off in FY 2016, and 
 
37 2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27. 
38 See 2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 31 (detailing the rise in disclosures from 
1,129 in FY 2013 to 1,554 in FY 2014).  
39 Id. 
40 See Michael Pearson, The VA’s Troubled History, CNN (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/23/politics/va-scandals-timeline/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8BXQ-NQ8B] (noting the January 2014 scandal over delays in treating 
veterans and falsification of medical records to cover up the delays). 
41 See, e.g., 2013 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of complaints, 
with VA totaling 985); 2014 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (identifying source of 
complaints, with VA totaling 1,504); 2015 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 
(identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 2,165); 2016 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. 
ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 1,887); 2017 U.S. OFF. 
SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 1,824); 
2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 13 (identifying source of complaints, with VA 
totaling 2,125); 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of 
complaints with VA totaling 1,843). 
42 2013 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of complaints, with VA 
totaling 985); 2014 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (identifying source of 
complaints, with VA totaling 1,504). 
43 2014 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (identifying source of complaints, with VA 
totaling 1,504); 2015 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of 
complaints, with VA totaling 2165). 
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has remained essentially flat since that time.44 As late as 2019, OSC noted 
that it “continue[d] to receive far more cases from VA employees than any 
other agency.”45 Thus, at least a portion of the increase the number of 
whistleblower disclosures may be attributable to the reporting of a higher 
than normal amount of gross misconduct, fraud, abuse of authority, or 
unlawful behavior in the federal government. 
However, these explanations do not explain the decrease in 
whistleblower disclosures since FY 2015, nor the lack of corresponding 
decrease in retaliation claims since then. Whistleblower disclosures had been 
increasing at OSC, with some variations each year, since FY 2006 up until 
FY 2015. Between FY 2015 and FY 2018, disclosures dropped 20%.46 But 
even though whistleblower disclosures peaked in FY 2015, PPP complaints 
to OSC did not. PPP complaints have continued to rise over time, with a 2.8% 
increase between FY 2015 and FY 2018.47 While whistleblowers were 
making fewer disclosures to OSC, more PPP complaints were being filed. 
This divergence between number of disclosures and PPP complaints is 
disturbing. As noted above, OSC offers a rationale for the increase in 
complaints filed with OSC: the ongoing issues at the VA. However, this does 
not explain why PPP complaints have failed to follow the same trend as 
whistleblower disclosures. PPP complaints filed by employees at the 
Department of Veterans Affairs peaked in FY 2015 and have stayed nearly 
constant at the FY 2016 levels. While this number has been flat, whistleblower 
disclosure numbers have been dropping. Thus, the issues at the Department of 
Veterans Affairs do not appear to be the source of the divergence between 
whistleblower disclosures and complaints filed with OSC. 
There are a few plausible explanations for the divergence between 
whistleblower disclosures and PPP complaints. The first possibility is that the 
PPP complaints include non-whistleblower related claims, and that these 
numbers obscure the trends in retaliation filings. This hypothesis is 
impossible to analyze without disaggregated data. Second, it is possible that 
retaliation numbers lag behind the disclosure numbers because retaliation 
occurs after the disclosure, after which the employee has to consider the 
circumstances and go through the process of filing a complaint with OSC. 
 
44 2016 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of complaints, with VA 
totaling 1,887); 2017 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of 
complaints, with VA totaling 1,824); 2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 13 
(identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 2,125); 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. 
ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of complaints with VA totaling 1,843). 
45 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14. 
46 Id. at 27. While there is data for FY 2019, OSC noted that the data would have been 
different if not for the government shutdown. See id. at 16. Thus, the best information is from 
FY 2018.  
47 See 2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (documenting the rise in claims). There 
was a dip in claims in FY 2017, but the number rose again in FY 2018. 




There is some support for this proposition in the data. While disclosures 
peaked in FY 2015, PPP complaints continued to increase in FY 2016 before 
dropping in FY 2017. This later peak in FY 2016 could be the result of the 
delay between disclosure and retaliation filing. On the other hand, disclosures 
dipped slightly between FY 2012 and FY 2013, yet PPP complaints increased 
between FY 2013 and FY 2014. Thus, a lagging retaliation claim is not a 
satisfactory explanation for why disclosure filings dropped between FY 2015 
and FY 2018 while PPP complaints increased.   
There are other plausible reasons that retaliation cases have not 
decreased at the same rate as whistleblower disclosures. It is possible that 
retaliation has been increasing in the government, or that whistleblowers 
perceive more retaliation. In other words, even though there are fewer 
whistleblower disclosures, a higher percentage of those making disclosures 
suffered from or believed they suffered from retaliation.48 Or, based on this 
same divergence in data, the amount of retaliation is the same, as shown by the 
fairly flat numbers of PPP complaints being filed, but fewer employees are 
willing to go to OSC to make a whistleblower disclosure. The reasons for this 
could be due to an increased fear of retaliation in general or a decrease in trust 
in OSC. Regardless of whether there is more retaliation (or the perception of 
it) or less trust in OSC, the overall drop in whistleblower disclosures coupled 
with the flat numbers of PPP complaints is disturbing. Why is this divergence 
occurring now? Part II, below, describes the anti-whistleblower tactics 
undertaken by the Trump administration, which appear to be at least a part of 
the reason for the drop in number of whistleblower disclosures.  
 
II. LOSING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS INDIRECTLY: THE WAR ON 
WHISTLEBLOWERS  
 
The history of whistleblowing protections for federal employees has 
been a movement toward greater statutory protections. However, the actions 
of the Trump administration have significantly undermined these statutory 
protections. Social science research has demonstrated that whistleblowing 
behavior decreases where organizational culture is not supportive of 
whistleblowing.49 Even though whistleblowers have the same rights on paper 
 
48 A related idea is that the rate of retaliation is not increasing, but employees perceive more 
retaliation and thus file more claims. Determining whether there has been an actual versus 
perceived increase in retaliation would require substantive review of all of the retaliation claims 
filed with OSC. This is far beyond the scope of this work. Furthermore, even a perception of 
increased retaliation has negative repercussions for whistleblowing, as discussed in Part II, so 
it may not matter the extent to which either or both explanations are correct. 
49 See PETER ROBERTS, A. J. BROWN & JANE OLSEN, WHISTLING WHILE THEY WORK: A 
GOOD-PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MANAGING INTERNAL REPORTING OF WRONGDOING IN PUBLIC 
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as they had under previous presidents, in reality, President Trump and his 
administration created a culture where whistleblowing was fraught with peril. 
The anti-whistleblowing culture was created by removing whistleblowers from 
their positions, threatening them on social media, targeting them with criminal 
investigations by the Department of Justice, and undermining the institutions 
designed to protect whistleblowers. These efforts did not go unnoticed: as early 
as 2017, a nonprofit was created to assist whistleblowers in the federal 
government.50 The organization was sufficiently concerned about government 
attempts to identify whistleblowers contacting the organization that it required 
whistleblowers attempting to contact it to use a special browser to limit the 
government’s ability to track users.51  
Each of the approaches used by the Trump administration to 
undermine whistleblower protections is examined below. 
 
A. Public Firings/Removals of Whistleblowers  
 
One way in which the Trump administration attempted to reduce 
whistleblowing was to openly retaliate against those who disclose or report 
wrongdoing within the administration and are not legally protected by federal 
whistleblower statutes. The most well-known of these individuals is probably 
Lieutenant Colonel Vindman, whose testimony before Congress supported 
the allegations of the Ukraine whistleblower.52 After President Trump was 
acquitted by the Senate, he ordered LTC Vindman to be removed from his 
position in the White House. In explaining LTC Vindman’s transfer out of 
the White House, the President remarked that LTC Vindman, “did a lot of 
bad things.”53 Other comments by the President included suggesting that the 
military investigate LTC Vindman and calling him “insubordinate.”54 
Ultimately, LTC Vindman retired from active duty, stating that political 
 
SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 18–19 (2011) (discussing how whistleblowing can be undermined 
by a lack of support within an organization for reporting wrongdoing). 
50 Carol Morello, Former Whistleblower Starts Legal Aid Group to Guide Would-Be 




52 Alana Abramson, Trump’s Attack on Vindman May Violate Whistleblower Protection 









retaliation would limit his future in the military.55 In his own words: “I made 
the difficult decision to retire because a campaign of bullying, intimidation 
and retaliation by President Trump and his allies forever limited the 
progression of my military career.”56   
Several other individuals within the Trump administration who 
testified in the impeachment inquiry in a way that was unfavorable to 
President Trump also were removed from their positions in a public manner. 
Gordon Sondland was removed from his position as the Ambassador to the 
European Union after he testified to facts supporting the whistleblower’s 
account of events.57    
Another example of the removal of a federal employee that appears 
to have been directed by President Trump and that relates to the impeachment 
inquiry is the removal of Michael Atkinson, the Inspector General for the 
intelligence community. Atkinson was removed because of his actions in 
determining that the whistleblower’s complaint met the criteria for reporting 
it to Congress, which he ultimately did.58 Nor was Atkinson the only 
Inspector General that President Trump removed. President Trump engaged 
in a wholesale firing of Inspectors General in 2019–2020. Trump removed 
Steve Linick, the Inspector General for the State Department, reportedly due 
to several investigations that he was conducting of Secretary of State Michael 
Pompeo’s behavior. Initial reports indicated that Inspector General Linick 
was targeted because he was investigating Secretary Pompeo for unlawfully 
using federal employees to perform personal errands.59 However, 
 
55 Katherine Faulders, Luis Martinez & Libby Cathey, Trump Impeachment Key Witness 
Alexander Vindman Retiring from Military Citing ‘Campaign of Bullying’, ABC NEWS (July 
8, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-impeachment-key-witness-alex 
ander-vindman-retiring-military/story?id=71672510 [https://perma.cc/Z8WQ-9GEQ].  
56 Alexander S. Vindman, Opinion, Coming Forward Ended My Career. I Still Believe Doing 
What’s Right Matters., WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/opinions/2020/08/01/alexander-vindman-retiring-oped/ [https://perma.cc/9WMT-2E7U]. 
57 See Peter Baker, Maggie Haberman, Danny Hakim & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Fires 
Impeachment Witnesses Gordon Sondland and Alexander Vindman in Post-Acquittal Purge, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/us/politics/alexander-vind 
man-gordon-sondland-fired.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/Y8WP-CXBL] 
(“President Trump wasted little time on Friday opening a campaign of retribution against 
those he blames for his impeachment, firing two of the most prominent witnesses in the 
House inquiry against him barely 48 hours after being acquitted by the Senate.”). 
58 Charlie Savage, Inspector General Fired by Trump Urges Whistle-Blowers ‘to Bravely 
Speak Up’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/ 
michael-atkinson-inspector-general-fired.html?auth=login-email&login=email&searchResult 
Position=1 [https://perma.cc/G76Q-FYZH]. 
59 Mike DeBonis & John Hudson, Fired Inspector General Was Examining Whether Pompeo 
Had a Staffer Walk His Dog, Handle Dry Cleaning, Official Says, WASH. POST (May 17, 
2020, 11:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/state-department-in 
spector-general-steve-linick-mike-pompeo/2020/05/17/daf5170a-98a7-11ea-b60c-3be060a 
4f8e1_story.html [https://perma.cc/A4ML-3YQ8]. 
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information quickly came to light that Inspector General Linick was also 
investigating Secretary Pompeo for allegedly pushing the sale of arms to 
Saudi Arabia without approval from Congress.60   
In his purge of Inspectors General, President Trump also targeted 
Inspector General Cristi Grimm at the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The notice to remove Grimm came only a few weeks after her office 
issued a report that highlighted problems with the response to the novel 
coronavirus at hospitals in the United States and contained information that 
contradicted President Trump’s characterizations about the circumstances of 
the pandemic.61 Glenn Fine, the Inspector General for the Department of 
Defense, was removed by Trump almost immediately after Congress gave 
that Inspector General’s office additional oversight authority in connection 
with huge spending bills passed to mitigate the effects of the pandemic.62 
President Trump removed acting Inspector General Mitch Behm from his 
position at the Department of Transportation. Behm was purportedly 
removed from his position because of his investigation into allegations that 
the Department of Transportation, headed by Secretary Elaine Chao, 
improperly provided preferential treatment to projects in Kentucky, where 
Secretary Chao’s husband Mitch McConnell is a senator.63   
The removal of employees who either spoke out publicly in a way that 
suggested that President Trump engaged in wrongdoing or who were 
investigating allegations of wrongdoing in the President’s administration 
extended beyond the impeachment inquiry and beyond Inspectors General. 
Indeed, it began early on in the Trump administration. In 2017, Joel Clement, 
a senior policy advisor at the Department of Interior, was removed from his 
position. Clement argued that the removal was in retaliation for his disclosure 
of how climate change would affect native Alaskan communities.64 Clement 
was reassigned to a position involving auditing, an area in which he had no 
 
60 Andrew Desiderio, Fired Watchdog Was Investigating Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, 
POLITICO (May 18, 2020, 5:16 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/18/linick-
administration-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-265024 [https://perma.cc/Q3NZ-BSK2]. 
61 Ledyard King, The Trump Administration Has Recently Moved to Oust 4 Government 




63 Ian Duncan & Michael Laris, Democrats Open Investigation into Trump’s Replacement of 




64 Darryl Fears, Interior Department Whistleblower Resigns; Bipartisan Former Appointees 
Object to Zinke’s Statements, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/04/whistleblower-resigns-keeping-my-voice- 
more-important-than-keeping-my-job/ [https://perma.cc/3N7Z-JDLU]. 




experience. A subsequent investigation by the Inspector General found that 
records of the removal were not kept as required by law and were so lacking 
that it was impossible to determine whether Clement’s removal was 
retaliatory.65 Clement was not the only employee at the Department of 
Interior to allege retaliation for having engaged in whistleblowing. The 
number of PPP complaints in the Department of Interior filed with OSC more 
than doubled in the first year of the Trump administration, from twenty-nine 
complaints in FY 2016 to seventy-two complaints in FY 2017.66 
More recently, similar retaliation allegations were made by Dr. Rick 
Bright. Dr. Bright was a top governmental employee who was working on 
the COVID-19 response at the Department of Health and Human Services.67 
Dr. Bright had been the Director of BARDA, the Biomedical Advanced 
Research Development Authority, as well as the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response. These entities worked on the US response to 
disease outbreaks. When President Trump touted the use of unproven 
treatments for COVID-19, Dr. Bright released information to the press about 
the lack of efficacy of these treatments. The reason he gave for going to the 
press was that he had attempted to work within the administration to change 
the perspective on the efficacy of these treatments, but as the death toll from 
COVID-19 rose, he felt that the public needed to know that the treatments were 
not effective.68 Almost immediately after the reporter’s work was published, 
Dr. Bright was removed from his position and transferred to NIH.69  
The implications of demotion or removal are most dire for employees 
who are not a part of the civil service. While Dr. Bright was not fired, he had 
the capacity to legally challenge his removal, which he did. The set of legal 
protections for civil servants includes two components: first, the right to directly 
challenge retaliatory conduct that is caused by employee whistleblowing; and 
second, the right to challenge significant disciplinary actions and removals on 
the grounds that the government lacked cause for its decisions.70   
 
65 Neela Banerjee, Investigators: We Can’t Tell if Interior Dept. Reassignments Were Legal 
Due to Lack of Records, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/11042018/zinke-interior-department-staff-reassignments-inspector-general-report-
whistleblower-joel-clement-doi-scientist [https://perma.cc/6HNV-48WN]. 
66 Hannah Northey, Federal Workforce: Interior Whistleblower Complaints Rise—But 
Why?, GREENWIRE (May 22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060082375/ 
search?keyword=Interior+Whistleblower+Complaints+Rise%2C+But+Why%3F+ [https:// 
perma.cc/5LB4-AGWZ].  
67 U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., COMPLAINT OF PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICE OR 
OTHER PROHIBITED ACTIVITY: RICK BRIGHT, addendum at 6 (2020), https://context-cdn. 
washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/6bfde4d6-4c3d-4671-8eeb-6b3d39e47c 
03/note/26f73d7a-d060-4c25-af4c-a58a167ee2c7.#page=1 [https://perma.cc/VSZ5-MXPL]. 
68 Id., addendum at 3.    
69 Id. 
70 For a detailed description of these protections, see infra Section I.B. 
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On the other hand, some of those who were removed from their 
positions by Trump— particularly political appointees—are unlikely to have 
any recourse for their removal. For example, LTC Vindman’s removal may 
be subject to challenge under the Military Whistleblowers Protection Act,71 
but it would be difficult to force Vindman’s reinstatement because of the 
sensitive/confidential nature of the position. Gordon Sondland, the former 
Ambassador to the European Union, was completely unprotected by any laws 
for providing testimony to Congress that was supportive of the whistleblower 
in the impeachment inquiry. Nor were the Inspectors General who President 
Trump removed provided any protection against retaliation. The only 
protection against removing an Inspector General is that the President has to 
provide thirty days’ notice to Congress.72 And while some congressional 
leaders have argued that the information provided by the President in these 
removals has been inadequate,73 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined in 2011 that a statement that the President had lost “the fullest 
confidence” in an Inspector General was sufficient under the statute.74 Thus, 
as a practical matter, the President can fire any Inspector General at any time 
for any or no reason.  
These examples of employees who were removed for either blowing 
the whistle or supporting investigations into wrongdoing are important 
because the retaliation occurred very publicly and received significant 
attention in the press.75 These public removals supported the approach of the 
 
71 Abramson, supra note 52. 
72 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b) (“If an Inspector General is removed from office . . . the President 
shall communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of 
Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”) 
73 See, e.g., Letter from Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, to Donald 
Trump, President of the United States (May 18, 2020), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/ 
51820 [https://perma.cc/T6E3-G7UG] (“You are required to notify Congress of your 
removal of an Inspector General. It is essential that you also inform Congress of the cause 
for the removal and your lack of confidence.”) 
74 Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Servs., 630 F.3d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
75 See Yasmeen Abutaleb & Laurie McGinley, Ousted Vaccine Official Alleges He Was 
Demoted for Prioritizing ‘Science and Safety’, WASH. POST (May 5, 2020, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05/05/rick-bright-hydroxychloroquine-whistle 
blower-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/2FS9-HPWH] (reporting that a top public health official 
was reassigned to a “less prestigious role” for raising health concerns about a coronavirus 
treatment “repeatedly pushed” by President Trump); Nathan Rott, Climate Scientist Says He 
Was Demoted For Speaking Out On Climate Change, NPR (July 19, 2017, 11:13 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/19/538216232/climate-scientist-says-he-
was-demoted-for-speaking-out-on-climate-change [https://perma.cc/5FJD-YY59] (reporting 
that a top policy advisor at the U.S. Department of the Interior was reassigned to a “lesser 
position for speaking out about the dangers of climate change.”); Peter Baker, Trump Moves 
to Replace Watchdog Who Identified Critical Medical Shortages, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/us/politics/trump-health-department-watchdog.html 
 




Trump administration to make it evident that those who openly report 
wrongdoing in the Trump administration would be immediately punished. 
And because there were no immediate consequences for those who retaliated, 
the message became clear to potential whistleblowers that they would suffer 
prompt retaliation. One of the goals was clearly to silence whistleblowers. 
Some of those who have been removed tried to push back against this implicit 
message of silencing whistleblowers. Michael Atkinson pleaded with federal 
employees to continue to disclose wrongdoing, asking them, “Please do not 
allow recent events to silence your voices.”76 
 
B. Criminal Investigations of Whistleblowers 
 
A second manner in which the Trump administration attempted to 
reduce whistleblowing was to increase the number of criminal investigations 
by the Department of Justice into disclosures to the media by federal 
employees. The trend toward investigation and prosecution of employees 
leaking information to the press did not actually begin under President 
Trump. Instead, the move began under President Bush, where, “during the 
CIA’s covert worldwide ‘war on terror,’ intelligence agencies and the Justice 
Department began aggressive investigations of classified information ‘leaks’ 
to the news media.”77 The trend continued under President Obama, who set a 
record for the most prosecutions (ten) of any administration of contractors 
and employees who leaked information to the media.78 
President Trump took this same approach and has pushed even more 
resources into investigating and prosecuting employee/contractor leaks. 
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions reported in August 2017 that a new 
focus on investigating leaks within the federal government would begin.79 
 
[https://perma.cc/ZPB8-JPEX] (reporting that a top official at the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services was replaced for “anger[ing]” President Trump with a report 
“highlighting supply shortages and testing delays at hospitals during the coronavirus 
pandemic.”); Eric Schmitt, Charlie Savage & Noah Weiland, Longtime Pentagon Watchdog 
Stepping Down From Post, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/ 
26/us/politics/pentagon-inspector-general-glenn-fine.html [https://perma.cc/4HVW-WVKC] 
(reporting that the head of a watchdog panel overseeing coronavirus pandemic relief 
spending was “ousted by President Trump”, likely because of his “reputation for 
aggressiveness”). 
76 Savage, supra note 58. 
77 Leonard Downie Jr., The Trump Administration and the Media, COMM. TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS (Apr. 16, 2020), https://cpj.org/reports/2020/04/trump-media-attacks-credibility-
leaks/ [https://perma.cc/KPT6-ETR3]. 
78 Id.  
79 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks at 
Briefing on Leaks of Classified Materials Threatening National Security (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-briefing-leaks-
classified-materials [https://perma.cc/A2ZY-6T88]. 
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DOJ tripled the number of leak investigations and directed the National 
Security Division and U.S. Attorneys to prioritize these cases. Although 
Attorney General Sessions’ briefing was only months into the Trump 
administration, four prosecutions of leakers had already been announced.80 
Since then, there have been additional prosecutions and convictions. Natalie 
Edwards, an official in the Treasury Department, was charged with illegally 
showing a journalist reports about President Trump’s wire transfers.81 She later 
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy in connection with the matter.82 Nor 
is the Edwards’ situation an outlier. In just under three years, the Trump 
administration indicted eight employees or contractors for leaking 
information.83 At that rate, the Trump administration was on track to indict 
more than twice as many employees/contractors as the Obama administration.   
The effect of the increased focus on investigating and prosecuting 
leaks was to chill whistleblowers.84 Liz Hempowicz, the director of public 
policy at the Project on Government Oversight, commented that “[t]hose 
prosecutions [under the Espionage Act] in my perspective were meant to 
make an example of these individuals . . . . making it less worth it for an 
individual to come forward [to report wrongdoing].”85 Gabe Rottman, 
technology and press freedom project director at the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, voiced similar concerns, stating that the trend toward 
more prosecutions is “trying to dissuade sources from coming forward and 
providing information to journalists.”86 
 
C. Use of Media to Retaliate against Whistleblowers 
 
In addition to removing employees who speak up about wrongdoing in 
his administration and investigating/prosecuting those who leak information to 
the press, President Trump used tactics to discourage whistleblowers that were 
 
80 Id. 
81 Emily Flitter, Treasury Official Charged with Leaking Bank Reports to Journalist, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/business/treasury-leak-mana 
fort.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/KQC4-EW9L].  
82 Corinne Ramey, Ex-Treasury Official Pleads Guilty to Leaks on Trump Campaign 
Officials, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ex-treasury-
official-pleads-guilty-to-leaks-on-trump-campaign-officials-11578956603 [https://perma.cc/ 
EZ8W-7YGY]. 
83 Downie, supra note 77. 
84 Historically, with such limited investigations and prosecutions of leakers, there was arguably 
no chilling effect caused by the relatively few investigations and prosecutions. See Margaret B. 
Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387, 1415 (2015) (discussing the 
lack of deterrence of whistleblowers by criminal investigations and prosecutions). 
85 Brittany Gibson, All the President’s Whistleblowers, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 18, 2019), https:// 
prospect.org/justice/all-the-presidents-whistleblowers/ [https://perma.cc/77NG-6Z84]. 
86 Downie, supra note 77. 




dramatically different than in previous administrations: he used social media and 
the press to directly impugn whistleblowers. Examples of his attacks on 
whistleblowers, primarily on Twitter, abound. Trump called the whistleblower 
who divulged the facts leading up to his impeachment, “a disgrace to our 
country.”87 Other attacks on this whistleblower include attempting to cast doubt 
on the motives of the whistleblower by calling him “highly partisan”88 and 
impugning the whistleblower’s status by referring to him as a 
“#FakeWhistleblower,”89 a “so-called” whistleblower90 whose “2ND HAND 
description of the call [between President Trump and the Ukrainian 
President] is a fraud.”91 President Trump also suggested that the 
whistleblower was a spy,92 worked for Joe Biden,93 and was a “Deep State” 
operative.94 President Trump attacked the veracity and underlying accuracy 
of the whistleblower’s allegations, tweeting that one of the alleged statements 
by the whistleblower “is a very big Lie [sic],”95 and that the whistleblower 
“had the facts wrong about the phone call.”96 
 
87 Riley Beggin, The Whistleblower’s Lawyer Says Attacking Him Is Illegal as Trump’s 
Attacks Continue, VOX (Nov. 9, 2019, 10:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/11/9/20956525/trump-impeachment-whistleblower-lawyer-cease-desist-letter 
[https://perma.cc/8Y3H-3BAW]. 
88 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22%E2%80%9Chighly+partisan%E2%80%9D+whistl
eblowers%22 [https://perma.cc/UW5B-YW2P]. Twitter permanently suspended President 
Trump’s account in January 2021 “due to the risk of further incitement of violence.” Permanent 
Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER: BLOG (Jan. 8, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/ 
en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html [https://perma.cc/ SQ4B-V9RS]. 
89 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:44 AM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22%23FakeWhistleblower%22 [https://perma. 
cc/SA2B-ZN2E].  
90 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 22, 2019, 8:03 PM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22supposedly+comes+from+a+so-called%22 
[https://perma.cc/GZ8D-BBE7]. 
91 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%222nd+hand+description%22 [https://perma.cc/ 
MTN7-4NV3]. 
92 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2019, 9:42 PM), https:// 
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22whistleblower+spy%22 [https://perma. 
cc/JCN2-L4XY]. 




95 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 9, 2019, 7:43 AM), https:// 
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22is+a+very+big+lie%22 [https://perma. 
cc/B8D6-Z772]. 
96 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 4, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22had+the+facts+wrong%22 [https://perma. 
cc/L39H-SFSZ]. 
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More recently, President Trump attacked Captain Crozier, the naval 
officer whose letter disclosing large numbers of COVID-19 infections on his 
vessel and asking for assistance was leaked to the press. President Trump 
commented that “I thought it was terrible, what he did, to write a letter.”97 
Promptly after the President made these comments, Captain Crozier was 
removed from his command of an aircraft carrier.98 Trump also attacked Dr. 
Bright, the whistleblower on the issue of the government’s coronavirus response, 
tweeting that Dr. Bright “fabricates stories,” “spews lies,” and is “a creep.”99 
President Trump’s attacks sometimes focused on the employee’s job 
performance as a cover for reprisals taken. For example, when he ordered the 
removal of Michael Atkinson as Inspector General for the intelligence 
community, President Trump said that “[Atkinson] did a terrible job, 
absolutely terrible.”100 
Similarly, President Trump tweeted about LTC Vindman: “[H]e was 
very insubordinate, reported contents of my ‘perfect’ calls incorrectly & . . . 
was given a horrendous report by his superior, the man he reported to, who 
publicly stated that Vindman had problems with judgement, adhering to the 
chain of command, and leaking information.”101 
Yet another approach taken by Trump in the media to attack 
whistleblowers was to call for an investigation of the whistleblower—not the 
allegations made by the whistleblower, but an investigation into the 
whistleblower him- or herself. For instance, as to the whistleblower whose 
complaint launched the impeachment, President Trump tweeted, “Why isn’t 
the IG [Inspector General] investigating his so-called whistleblower?”102 
More broadly, President Trump called for an investigation into the overall 
system of protecting whistleblowers, tweeting that “[t]his whole 
 
97 Max Boot, Opinion, Capt. Crozier’s Firing Shows the Growing Trumpification of the 




99 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (May 17, 2020, 10:15 PM), https:// 
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22fabricates+stories%22 [https:// 
perma.cc/NA3E-D26M]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2020, 
10:15 PM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22spews+lies%22 
[https://perma.cc/6U2Y-TUM2]. 
100 Savage, supra note 58.    
101 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2020, 9:41 AM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22very+insubordinate%22 [https://perma. 
cc/6FS3-BWAK]. 
102 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:42 AM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22the+IG+his+so-called+whistleblower%22 
[https://perma.cc/Q9TB-7SFM]. 




Whistleblower [sic] racket needs to be looked at very closely, it is causing 
great injustice & harm.”103 
In addition to personally attacking whistleblowers, President Trump 
attempted to intimidate whistleblowers by using the press and social medial. For 
example, he made repeated efforts to reveal the identity of the whistleblower in 
the intelligence community whose complaint led to the impeachment inquiry,104 
to the extent that the whistleblower’s attorney sent a cease-and-desist letter to the 
President.105 Under the relevant statute, the whistleblower was entitled to bring 
his complaint anonymously, and the President’s repeated tweets asking where 
the whistleblower was threatened that right.106 President Trump also appeared to 
endorse the idea of suing the whistleblower.107 
Similarly, the President attacked Dr. Bright, the official who alleged 
he was removed from his position coordinating the attempts to create a 
vaccine for COVID-19. When Dr. Bright filed his whistleblower complaint 
and testified before a congressional subcommittee on the failings of the 
Trump administration’s response to the novel coronavirus, President Trump 
called Dr. Bright, “nothing more than a really unhappy, disgruntled 
person.”108 President Trump also suggested that Dr. Bright should be fired, 
tweeting that “to me he is a disgruntled employee, not liked or respected by 
people I spoke to and who, with his attitude, should no longer be working for 
our government!”109 
 
103 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2020, 10:15 PM), https://www. 
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22it+is+causing+great+injustice%22 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q9QF-2CRG]. 
104 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2019, 6:39 AM), https:// 
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22we+must+determine+the%22 
[https://perma.cc/SK4R-NYYV] (“We must determine the Whistleblower’s [sic] identity.”). 
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2019, 3:26 PM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22where+is+the+whistleblowe
r+who+gave%22 [https://perma.cc/GTH6-WZUH] (“Where is the Whistleblower [sic] who 
gave so much false information? Must testify . . . !”); see also Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 17, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://www.thetrump 
archive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22Where+is+the+Fake+Whistleblower%22 [https:// 
perma.cc/V9RV-MRZP] (“Where is the Fake Whistleblower? [sic]”). 
107 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2020, 1:16 AM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22sue+the+whistleblower%22 
[https://perma.cc/RP4U-T4DF] (retweeting @josepheschmitz’s call for the President to sue 
the whistleblower).  
108 Danielle Zoellner & Alex Woodward, Coronavirus Whistleblower Says ‘Lives Were Lost’ 
After Trump Administration Removed Him from Meetings Where He Raised Alarms, INDEP. 
(May 14, 2020, 4:57 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/corona 
virus-whistleblower-rick-bright-trump-white-house-a9514821.html [https://perma.cc/6Y33-
2K9H]. 
109 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 14, 2020, 8:37 AM),  
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Nor did President Trump limit his attacks to the whistleblowers 
themselves. President Trump attacked those associated with the 
whistleblowers. President Trump not only removed LTC Vindman from his 
position, he also had LTC Vindman’s twin brother removed from his then-
current position.110 As one commentator stated, “Such gratuitous score-
settling carries a whiff of the Cosa Nostra, in which talking to the feds results 
in one’s family being targeted—in part to send a message to other potential 
rats.”111 Similarly, Trump has attacked the Ukraine whistleblower’s attorney, 
calling his behavior “treason.”112  
Not only did President Trump himself attack whistleblowers, those 
closely associated with him also did so. Donald Trump, Jr. attacked LTC 
Vindman’s testimony before Congress, saying that “[a]nyone listening to 
Vindman stammer through this seemingly trying to remember the Catch 
Phrases he was well coached on should get that. He’s a low-level partisan 
bureaucrat and nothing more.”113 
President Trump’s targeting of whistleblowers and those close to 
them has encouraged his supporters to follow his lead. High level supporters, 
such as Rand Paul and other Republicans in Congress, called for the 
whistleblower to be publicly identified.114 Joseph DiGenova, a former 
prosecutor and Trump supporter, built on the idea of the whistleblower being 
a “spy” by saying that “[the whistleblower] worked at the CIA, and he is part 
of a political assassination.”115 DiGenova followed up on this line of thought 




110 Abramson, supra note 52. 
111 Michelle Cottle, Opinion, Vengeance Is Mine, Saith the President, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/opinion/trump-impeachment-enemies.html?searchResult 
Position=1 [https://perma.cc/2ARD-5Q3S]. 
112 Greg Sargent, Opinion, Death Threat to Whistleblower’s Lawyer Points to Trump’s 
Depravity, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2020, 4:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/op 
inions/2020/02/20/death-threat-whistleblowers-lawyer-points-trumps-depravity/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VJY-R8H8]. 
113 Rebecca Shabad, White House, Trump Associates Trash Lt. Col. Vindman’s Testimony, 
NBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2019, 6:52 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-impeachment-
inquiry/white-house-trump-associates-trash-lt-col-vindman-s-testimony-n1086351 [https:// 
perma.cc/VD6N-QDQH]. 
114 Dustin Volz, Trump Allies Ramp Up Efforts to Unmask Whistleblower, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
3, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-allies-ramp-up-efforts-to-unmask-
whistleblower-11572724750?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1 [https://perma.cc/6YWJ-
QUTG]. 
115 David Corn, As Trump Attacks, Death Threats Against the Whistleblower and His 








attacked the impeachment whistleblower and his attorney, both were 
subjected to death threats.117 The threats were significant enough that law 
enforcement became involved,118 and ultimately one man was charged by 
federal prosecutors with making a death threat aimed at the whistleblower’s 
attorney.119 Similarly, LTC Vindman received so many attacks on social 
media that he was provided with security for himself and his family.120  
The point of all of the President’s attacks on whistleblowers was to 
discourage whistleblowers.121 Former Inspector General Michael Atkinson 
recognized the risks created by these types of public attacks, noting in March 
2020 that “the past six months have been a searing time for whistleblowers” 
because whistleblowers are “allowed to be vilified, threatened, publicly 
ridiculed.”122 
 
D. Cutting Whistleblower Protection Resources 
 
One of the ways in which whistleblowers protections have 
indirectly been eroded in recent years is by the decreased funding of the 
OSC. OSC’s FY 2021 Congressional Budget Justification shows a 
decrease in funding as compared with previous years.123 OSC noted that 
the decrease in funding would result in the need to eliminate fifteen full-
time employees and that it would not “be able to adequately carry out its 
mission.”124 In addressing its staffing levels, OSC stated that it has seen 




119 Natasha Bertrand, 'All Traitors Must Die': Feds Charge Man for Threatening 
Whistleblower Attorney, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/ 
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54WL-669B]. 
120 Luis Martinez, Army Providing Security Assistance to Vindman, a Key Witness in 
Impeachment Hearings, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2020, 2:51 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Pol 
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82 [https://perma.cc/N7JH-3KWF]. 
121 Sargent, supra note 112.  
122 Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector Gen. of the Intel. Cmty., to Charles Schumer, 
Senate Minority Leader (March 18, 2020), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-4737-
d6b1-a3f1-c7f715270000 [https://perma.cc/VQE3-4TEH]. 
123 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 




125 See id. at 6 (“Although OSC has received increased resources in previous appropriations 
packages, the growth in OSC’s caseload and increases in personnel costs have far outpaced 
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noted that its ability to respond to allegations of wrongdoing, fraud, and 
waste will be hampered by its budget.126    
OSC is a critically important fixture in promoting whistleblowing 
within the federal government. OSC provides information to prospective 
whistleblowers about the available ways in which federal employees can 
provide information on wrongdoing.127 It allows employees to confidentially 
report wrongdoing, which OSC then investigates.128 Furthermore, OSC’s 
very nature promotes whistleblowing; social science research suggests that 
lower level employees are more likely to report wrongdoing when there is a 
reporting system that is external to their workplace.129 OSC acts as that 
external reporting system due to its nature as an independent entity, separate 
and apart from the agencies within which federal employees work. 
The other federal agency that plays a role in protecting whistleblowers 
is the Merit Systems Protection Board. The MSPB decides cases in which 
whistleblowers allege that they have been retaliated against. As with OSC, 
the MPSB’s budget was targeted by the Trump administration. In FY 2021, 
the President’s budget provided for $42 million in funding, a cut of $4 million 
from FY 2020.130 The Merit Systems Protection Board, in its FY 2021 
Congressional Budget Justification, noted that any reduction in its budget 
“would have a direct adverse impact on the agency’s ability to protect the 
Federal merit systems, ensure due process, promote Government-wide merit 
system principles (MSPs), and prevent prohibited personnel practices 
(PPPs).”131 PPPs include claims made by whistleblowers who have suffered 
from retaliation.132   
Not only has there been there a lack of funding at the MSPB; there is 
also a huge backlog of cases. The MPSB has lacked a quorum for over three 
 
126 Id. at 7. 
127 OSC’s website is one of the primary ways it provides this information to federal 
employees. See Disclosure of Wrongdoing Overview, U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., 
https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/DU.aspx [https://perma.cc/G7XE-75UP] (last visited Mar. 
19, 2021) (describing services OSC provides for reporting wrongdoing). 
128 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (“The identity of any individual who makes a disclosure described in 
subsection (a) may not be disclosed by the Special Counsel without such individual’s 
consent . . . .”); see also id. (describing confidential reporting system). 
129 Jingyu Gao, Robert Greenberg & Bernard Wong-On-Wing, Whistleblowing Intentions of 
Lower-Level Employees: The Effect of Reporting Channel, Bystanders, and Wrongdoer 
Power Status, 126 J. BUS. ETHICS 85, 96–97 (2015). 




132 Id. at 6. 




years, beginning in January 2017 when Trump became president.133 Without 
a quorum, no cases can be decided by the Board. This has created a backlog 
of over 2,500 cases, the largest in history.134 The lack of a quorum on the 
board makes whistleblowers vulnerable to retaliation, according to the 
Executive Director of the Senior Executives Association.135  
 
III. REVITALIZING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS 
 
Given the myriad attacks on whistleblowers, directly and indirectly, 
by the Trump administration, it is essential to shore up whistleblower 
protections for federal employees. This is a matter of both substance and 
perception. Beyond the substantive changes in the legal system of 
protections, congressional action will help counteract the negative messages 
about whistleblowers during the Trump administration. I propose the 
following options as ways of improving the current situation and sending a 
message to whistleblowers that they will be protected by Congress. 
Before detailing the options below, it is worth noting one option that I 
do not include revitalizing First Amendment protections. While scholars have 
spilled much ink agonizing over the current (minimal) state of First Amendment 
protections for federal employee-whistleblowers,136 the practical reality is that 
the current Supreme Court has been making it more difficult for whistleblowing 
employees to obtain protections under the First Amendment, with no apparent 
desire to improve such protections.137 Instead of focusing on the highly unlikely 
 
133 Nicole Ogrysko, Lack of Quorum Hits 3-Year Mark at MSPB, With No Clear End in Sight, 





136 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 
93 IND. L.J. 267, 274–75 (2018) (proposing new protections for whistleblowers under the 
First Amendment).  
137 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (creating the additional requirement 
that an employee establish that his/her speech was not made as part of their professional 
duties for the speech to enjoy First Amendment protection). There are numerous scholarly 
works noting Garcetti’s negative effect on government employees. See, e.g., Paul M. 
Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 118 (2008) (outlining the three “reason[s] for Garcetti’s 
magnified effect on federal employees.”); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee 
Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2009) (lamenting the “government’s expansive claims to control public 
employees’ expression” which “imperi[l] . . . the free speech rights of more than twenty 
million government workers.”); Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization 
of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2013) (“By stripping protections from 
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rescue of whistleblowers by the Supreme Court, this Article suggests other 
measures that have a greater likelihood of implementation. 
 
A. Allow Anonymous Reporting to OSC 
 
The current whistleblower protection laws for federal employees do 
not provide for anonymous reporting of wrongdoing by most civil servants.138 
There are some exceptions. Within the intelligence community, there are 
provisions for employees to blow the whistle anonymously, as illustrated by 
the impeachment whistleblower.139 However, this is the exception, not the 
rule. At the present time, the only manner for most federal employees to 
disclose information without openly revealing their identities is for them to file 
a confidential complaint with the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC).140 Note 
that this is not an anonymous report, only a confidential one, meaning that the 
Special Counsel at least will know the identity of the whistleblower.141 And 
while the Special Counsel is officially prohibited from revealing the identity of 
the whistleblower without their consent,142 in the current political environment 
it is quite plausible that identities could be leaked.   
Creating a truly anonymous reporting option to OSC would promote 
whistleblowing by those who are concerned about the not only on-the-job 







public employees and converting them to at-will status, civil service reforms create a chilling 
effect. Employees will be less likely to speak about government and express valuable dissent 
if their job is on the line.”).  
138 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a) (describing who is entitled to make disclosures to the Special Counsel 
in OSC and Inspector Generals within agencies); id. at § 1213(h) (prohibiting the Special 
Counsel, but not Inspectors General, from revealing the identity of the employee making the 
disclosure without the employee’s consent).  
139 See 50 U.S.C. § 3033 (denoting the duties of the Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community as to creating an effective, accountable office that honestly self-
regulates). 
140 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h); see also Confidentiality & Anonymity When Filing A Disclosure 
Claim, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/DU-Confidentiality. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/783R-DGCT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (discussing confidentiality 
in reporting practices of OSC). 
141 For a thorough discussion of the merits of anonymity versus confidentiality in 
whistleblowing, see Tanya M. Marcum & Jacob Young, Blowing the Whistle in the Digital 
Age: Are You Really Anonymous? The Perils and Pitfalls of Anonymity in Whistleblowing 
Law, 17 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2019). 
142 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h). 




B. Promote Anonymous Reporting Channels to Congress 
 
Many congressional committees have created a form for online 
reporting by federal workers.143 These forms do allow for anonymous 
reporting by allowing employees to withhold their names or contact 
information. However, it is unclear to what extent employees are aware of 
this option. There are outreach campaigns by the Office of Special Counsel 
to promote reporting wrongdoing to the OCS,144 but no similar outreach by 
Congress. Especially if Congress fails to create an option for anonymous 
reporting to OSC, it would be beneficial to whistleblowers to make the 
anonymous reporting options to Congress more widely known. There are 
posting requirements for a number of federal employee protection laws;145 it 
would not be difficult for Congress to require that federal workplaces post 
information on reporting options for whistleblowers. In addition, providing 
this information on the OSC website and ensuring that OSC personnel make 
this option known to employees would promote anonymous reporting. 
 
C. Deter Identification of Anonymous Whistleblowers 
 
In order to provide teeth to the anonymous reporting options 
described above, Congress should amend current whistleblower protection 
statutes to add provisions imposing consequences on those who disclose the 
identity of anonymous whistleblowers. In the wake of the first impeachment 
of President Trump, such provisions have been proposed as to anonymous 
whistleblowers within the intelligence community.146 However, it is not 
merely whistleblowers in the intelligence community who should be 
protected from the potential for exposure and social media attacks. All 
 
143 See, e.g., Whistleblower Rights, HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 
https://transportation.house.gov/whistleblower-rights [https://perma.cc/BU56-EFRT] (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (allowing anonymous reporting to the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure); Whistleblowers, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., https:// 
foreignaffairs.house.gov/whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/TS5L-J4RV] (last visited Mar. 
10, 2021) (allowing anonymous reporting to the Foreign Affairs Committee). 
144 See Outreach, Training, & Certification Overview, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., 
https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/Outreach.aspx [https://perma.cc/EX2Z-XVSW] (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2021) (listing outreach opportunities). 
145 See “EEO is the Law” Poster, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www. 
eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-law-poster#:~:text=The%20law%20requires%20an%20employer, 
pay%2C%20disability%20or%20genetic%20information [https://perma.cc/VYK9-65CG] (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (listing display requirements for equal employment opportunity laws). 
146 Emma Loop, After Trump’s Ukraine Scandal, Congress Is Moving to Strengthen 
Whistleblower Protections, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 3, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www. 
buzzfeednews.com/article/emmaloop/trump-ukraine-impeachment-whistleblower-protections 
[https://perma.cc/YG6R-9CMR]. 
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anonymous whistleblowers within the federal government should have their 
anonymity preserved.   
The difficulty with this approach is with determining how to deter the 
identification of anonymous whistleblowers. If the person who discloses the 
information is an employee within the civil service, it would be simple to 
mandate that divulging the employee’s identity would be a disciplinary 
offense for which the offender would face suspension or dismissal, depending 
on the circumstances. Much more difficult to resolve would be the question 
of how to handle disclosures of whistleblowers by Congresspersons, 
Senators, and their staff. Making it a crime for a member of Congress or their 
staff to disclose a whistleblower’s identity seems extreme. A lesser option 
would be to allow a civil claim if the whistleblower faces significant 
consequences, such as receiving threats of physical harm to themselves or 
their family. The parameters of this type of civil claim are discussed in detail 
in Section III.G, infra.   
 
D. Protect Inspectors General from Retaliation 
 
While federal law protects most federal employees against retaliation, 
it does not protect Inspectors General. This omission needs to be remedied. 
The relevant statute requires that Inspectors General be appointed, “by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard 
to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated 
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, 
public administration, or investigations.”147 As the statute indicates, 
Inspectors General represent a hybrid position in that the President has the 
power to select them but by statutory mandate, they are not to be mere 
partisan political operatives seeking to cover up wrongdoing.148 Furthermore, 
the Inspectors General are a critical feature of the overall protection of federal 
employee-whistleblowers.149 As Senator Charles Schumer stated: “Without 
the courage of whistleblowers and the role of Inspectors General, the 
American people may never have known how the President abused his power 
in the Ukraine scandal.”150   
Inspectors General, when not inhibited by fear of retaliation, are a 
critical feature of the federal system of protections because they have the 
power to hinder or promote investigations into whistleblowers’ allegations of 
 
147 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).    
148 Id. 
149 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
150 Marianne Levine, Schumer Asks Inspectors General to Investigate Whistleblower 
Retaliation After Vindman Firing, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2020, 5:30 AM) (emphasis added), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/10/schumer-investigate-whistleblower-retaliation-
vindman-113022 [https://perma.cc/CRL7-VF8N].  




wrongdoing.151 One of the tasks of Inspectors General is to oversee the 
investigation of whistleblower allegations.152 If Inspectors General 
understand that they are likely to be removed for allowing allegations of 
wrongdoing to come to light, there is a clear incentive to bury such 
allegations. And while some allegations will not have negative political 
implications for the sitting administration, it is inevitable that some will, and 
that these may never come to light if Inspectors General are removed for 
doing their statutorily-mandated duties. This concern is particularly acute in 
areas where the whistleblower is dealing with information that is classified 
or otherwise protected by statute. As discussed in Section II.B., supra, with 
an increasing focus on investigating and prosecuting releases of such 
information, if the Inspector General does not investigate and take action, and 
the whistleblower discloses information to the media because they believe 
that the public needs to know of such information, then the whistleblower is 
putting themselves at a high risk of criminal investigation. 
The challenge of the Inspector General position is determining what 
type of protection officers should be provided. While the Inspector General 
Act contemplates the appointment of an individual who will perform the 
duties of the office in a nonpartisan,153 competent154 way, these provisions 
are not enforceable because the President retains the nearly unlimited 
authority to remove the Inspectors General at any time by providing notice 
and a reason for the removal to Congress.155 Thus, the integrity of the system 
depends entirely on the individuals appointed and the President. Some 
Inspectors General will follow their statutory mandates without regard to the 
fact that they can be removed at the whim of the President. Others, 
particularly after the purge of Inspectors General under President Trump, will 
become at least somewhat more circumspect.   
In order to ensure that the system of Inspectors General actually works, 
one option is to change the nature of the Inspector General position. Inspectors 
General could become career civil service positions not subject to the 
appointments process. This approach would insulate Inspectors General from 
political pressures far more effectively than the current system. Furthermore, it 
has the potential to strengthen the civil service system by providing a powerful 
protector within the system who is not subject to the political whims of the 
 
151 See discussion supra Section II.A.  
152 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(d)(1)(C). 
153 This is evident from the requirement that the Inspector General be appointed without 
regard to political affiliation. Id. § 3(a). 
154 This is evident from the requirement that the Inspector General have “demonstrated 
ability” in the skills necessary for the position. Id.  
155 See discussion supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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President.156 However, there are a couple of flaws with this approach. First, it 
is possible that when a position becomes vacant and a new Inspector General 
is hired, those in charge of the hiring process will be political appointees and 
will focus on hiring an individual who, while not overtly political, shares a 
political perspective with them. Second, having a person with the powers of an 
Inspector General not be appointed by the President may infringe upon the 
President’s rights under the Appointments Clause.  
Even under the current statutory system, the constitutionality of the 
removal provision of Inspector General positions has long been questioned. 
When the Inspector General Act of 1978 was under consideration by 
Congress, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel opined that 
the draft legislation was unconstitutional for several reasons.157 Three of the 
constitutional objections raised by the DOJ OLC focused on the reporting 
obligations of Inspectors General to Congress—requirements this Article 
does not touch upon.158 However, the fourth constitutional concern raised by 
the DOJ OLC was that requiring the President to provide a reason for the 
removal of an Inspector General violated that President’s constitutional right 
to “remove Presidentially appointed executive officers.”159 Despite this 
objection, the final version of the Act contained the requirement that the 
President provide a reason for the removal of an Inspector General.160 
The current state of the constitutionality of limitations on the 
appointments power and removal power is unclear. Scholars of 
administrative law such as Michael Livermore and Daniel Richardson have 
described its state as being at “the breaking point.”161 While there are many 
reasons for this, one of the contributing factors is current Supreme Court 
doctrine interpreting the Appointments Clause. In 2018, the Supreme Court 
decided Lucia v. SEC,162 in which it determined that the Administrative Law 
Judges at the Securities and Exchange Commission were improperly 
considered a part of the civil service, and that they were properly to be 
considered “officers” of the executive branch who are to be appointed by the 
President.163 The Court applied a multi-part test. First, if a position is 
 
156 A potential fringe benefit of this approach is that it might contribute to the lessening of 
partisan volatility, at least within the civil service. See Michael A. Livermore & Daniel 
Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of Partisan Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 4–6 
(2019) (noting several reasons for the current state of “partisan volatility” for which the 
current administrative law apparatus is ill-suited, including “the weakening of moderating 
institutions such as the civil service.”). 
157 Inspector General Legislation, 1 Op. O.L.C 16, 18 (1977).    
158 Id. at 17–18. 
159 Id. at 18. 
160 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b). 
161 Livermore & Richardson, supra note 156, at 6. 
162 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
163 Id. at 2055. 




“continuing” rather than temporary, that suggests the position is more likely 
to be an “officer” rather than a mere “employee.”164 Second, if individuals have 
“significant discretion” when carrying out “important functions,” that indicates 
that they are officers, not employees.165 The Court, however, refused to provide 
any additional guidance as to the meaning of these very broad concepts. Part 
of this is likely due to an inability to reach consensus on the appropriate 
parameters of the test to determine whether an individual is an “officer” or a 
“mere employee.”166 It is quite likely that changing the status of the Inspectors 
General to become part of the civil service will result in legal challenge. The 
outcome of this challenge is not clear for two reasons. First, it is not clear 
whether Inspectors General are “officers” who the president has the power to 
appoint and remove. Second, if the Inspectors General are in fact officers 
subject to presidential appointment, the Supreme Court has held that some for-
cause removal provisions do not violate the Constitution.167 
As to the first point, because Inspectors General are clearly permanent 
positions, which weighs in favor of “officer” rather than “employee,” the bulk 
of the analysis will likely focus on whether they have “significant 
discretion.”168 The fact that Inspectors General can conduct investigations 
within their agency without oversight, including obtaining documents and 
interviewing witnesses, suggests that they have significant discretion.169 
Thus, the question appear to devolve to whether these investigative powers 
constitute “important functions.”170 The scope of what they can investigate, 
which includes investigating the head of the agency in which they work, tends  
 
 
164 Id. at 2052. 
165 Id. 
166 The case spawned a dissent by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, on one hand, which argued 
for a new standard, and a separate dissent by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, 
which suggested that there was no need to even reach the constitutional issue. The approach 
of the latter dissent may be to avoid reaching the constitutional issue out of concerns that the 
conservative majority would substantially change the standard to make more positions 
subject to the Appointments Clause. See id. at 2056–57 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 2057–64 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., concurring 
in the judgement in part and dissenting in part). 
167 See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the President’s power 
to remove an executive officer must be conferred by Congress); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (holding that President’s power to remove an officer 
“will depend upon the character of the office”). 
168 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (discussing the exercise of “significant discretion” by the 
SEC’s administrative law judges). 
169 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (“Neither the head of the establishment nor the officer next in 
rank below such head shall prevent . . . the Inspector General from initiating . . . any audit or 
investigation”); id. § 6(a) (providing the Inspector General with broad access to records, 
reports, documents, and federal grand jury materials). 
170 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.  
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to indicate that their investigations, which are the heart of their position, are 
“important functions.”171 It is quite likely that a court would determine that 
Inspectors General are officers, not employees.172 
As to the right to limit removal of the Inspectors General, for-cause 
removal provisions have been allowed at times. The state of the law is quite 
complicated.173 For cause removal provisions have been allowed when the 
position in question is adjudicatory in nature.174 In the case of the Postmaster 
General’s position, congressional reservation of removal rights was held to 
be an improper usurpation of presidential power to remove at will.175 
Furthermore, for-cause removal provisions have been allowed as to the head 
of an independent agency.176 Inspectors General do not fall neatly into any of 
these precedents.    
Taking an approach along these lines, a bill was recently passed by 
the House of Representatives that would not make Inspectors General career 
civil service appointees, but would provide some limitations on firing 
them.177 Under the Inspector General Independence Act, Inspectors General 
could only be removed for permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, knowing violation of a law, rule, or regulation, malfeasance, gross 
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or conviction of a 
felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.178 This approach would not 
solve the constitutional issues discussed above because it still limits the 
authority of the President to remove a high-ranking official.   
 
171 Id. 
172 It is also possible that a court would not focus on the Lucia approach, but instead would 
draw upon the approach articulated in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting 
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010), in which the Court allowed for-cause removal 
of members of the PAB. In that case, the focus of the Court was on presidential removal of 
officers who “execute the laws.” Id. at 492, 496, 501. 
173 See id. at 515 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the conflict between congressional 
authority to create federal agencies and the presidential authority to appoint and remove 
officers of such agencies). Justice Breyer’s dissent explains the problem concisely: the 
Constitution is silent on removal authority, history is unclear on its scope, and the Court’s 
precedents do not lead to a clear outcome. See id. at 515–19. 
174 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623–28 (1935) (holding that FTC 
commissioners may be removed by the President for cause); Wiener v. United States, 357 
U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the President could not remove a member of an 
adjudicatory body “merely because he wanted his own appointees on such a Commission”).  
175 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (“[T]he unrestricted power of 
removal of first-class postmasters is denied to the President”). 
176 See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28 (permitting for-cause removal with respect to 
the FTC, which “cannot be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive” and “acts as 
a legislative agency”). 
177 The Heroes Act, H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. § 70104 (2020). 
178 Id. § 70104(b)(2). 




This is not the first time that this approach has been proposed. In 2008, 
the Inspector General Act was amended to require that Presidents provide 
thirty days advance notice of removals of Inspectors General.179 The draft bill 
also proposed a seven-year term and limited removals to reasons similar to 
those in the Heroes Act.180  
A less transformative, more incremental approach to protecting 
Inspectors General would be to revise the statute to state that the President 
must state the reasons, in detail, for the removal or transfer of an Inspector 
General, including providing at least one specific example of the behavior, 
conduct, or action(s) of the Inspector General that led to his or her removal 
or transfer. This would help address the type of situation that arose when 
President Trump removed Michael Atkinson. The President’s notice to 
Congress was very vague, stating that the President had lost confidence in the 
Inspector General, but there was no explanation of the circumstances that led 
to the loss of confidence.181 Some Senators pushed back on the President’s 
letter, arguing that the legislative history of the removal provision in the 
statute made it clear that Inspectors General should be removed only for 
reasons such as malfeasance, failure to perform their duties, or for personal 
actions that would discredit the office of Inspector General.182 However, 
while the legislative history may provide information on the goal of the law, 
there is nothing in the statute as currently written that requires any degree of 
detail on the reasons for the removal of an Inspector General.183 And, as 
discussed above, the statutory provision has been interpreted to allow the 
most minimal statement of a reason—losing the “fullest confidence” in the 
Inspector General.184 Thus, the most minimal change to the statute would be 
to require greater detail in the reasons for the removal.     
Another possibility would be to require that in the event of the 
removal of an Inspector General, not only must the President provide the 
reason(s) for the removal, but the notification to Congress would also trigger 
a congressional committee or subcommittee hearing on the reasons for the 
removal. The right to the hearing would provide a greater focus on the 
removal and could assist in bringing public pressure to bear on the decision 
 
179 Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No. 110-409, § 3(b), 122 Stat. 4302, 
4302.  
180 BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11546, REMOVAL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL: 
RULES, PRACTICE, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2020); H.R. 6800 § 70104. 
181 See Savage supra note 58. 
182 Letter from Charles Grassley et al., U.S. Senator, to Donald J. Trump, President of the 
United States (Apr. 8, 2020) (citing JOINT STAFF REP. OF S. COMM. ON FIN. & H. COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., THE FIRING OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR 
THE CORPORATION/OR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 47 (Comm. Print. 2009)). 
183 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b) (failing to require the reasoning behind an Inspector General’s 
removal). 
184 Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Servs., 630 F.3d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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to remove an Inspector General. It is far easier for a President to simply state 
a reason—which could be anything—when there is no real opportunity for 
the Inspector General to offer his or her version of events. This type of 
hearing could provide additional incentives for the President to not fire 
Inspectors General due to the more public nature of the termination.   
 
E. Restore Necessary Resources for OSC and MSPB 
 
An obvious way to shore up whistleblower protections is to ensure 
that the offices that support whistleblowers receive adequate resources. 
Congress should ensure that the budgetary needs of OSC are met so that the 
office is properly equipped to support whistleblowers and investigate 
disclosures made by whistleblowers. The MSPB also needs to be properly 
funded and staffed. Additional funding may be required for the MSPB to 
expeditiously eliminate the staggering backlog of cases.185 
As for vacancies on the MSPB, it seems unlikely that any will be 
appointed until after the November 2020 election. Regardless of the outcome 
of the election, appointing members to the MPSB must be a priority for the 
next administration. The political persuasion of the potential appointees is 
less important than the need to reduce the massive backlog of cases. 
Decisions by the MSPB are reviewable in federal court, which limits the 
degree to which partisan political operatives can alter existing interpretations 
of whistleblower protection laws.   
 
F. Eliminate the Focus on Investigating Leaks, Amend the Espionage Act to 
Limit Prosecutions, and Overhaul the Classification System 
 
There are three ways of handling the excessive focus on investigating 
and prosecuting federal employees and the media that began in the Obama 
administration and was expanded in the Trump administration. First, and 
most directly, the DOJ special unit focusing on leaks should be eliminated. 
There is no evidence that the leaks investigated by its office had a negative 
effect on our national security. Any small deterrent effect this unit has on 
those who do have truly nefarious goals is likely overshadowed by its chilling 
effect on disclosures that are legitimately in the public interest. At a 
minimum, the focus of the unit should be shifted away from “leakers” and 
instead into investigations of serious offenses.186      
 
185 See supra text accompanying notes 133–35. 
186 Another option would be to retain the unit and create guidelines for determining what 
disclosures of information are appropriate for prosecution. See, e.g., David J. Ryan, National 
Security Leaks, the Espionage Act, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 6 HOMELAND & NAT'L 
SEC. L. REV. 59, 61 (2018) (explaining how the Obama administration created guidelines for 
 




Another option would be for Congress to amend the Espionage Act. 
There have been numerous suggestions on how to do this to eliminate the 
targeting of journalists and whistleblowers. One option would be to create a 
scienter requirement; specifically, that the purpose of the individual 
disclosing classified information is to harm the interests of the United States 
and/or benefit the interests of a foreign government.187 Another option is to 
create an exception to the statute to allow disclosures to the media so long as 
the whistleblower attempted to use internal reporting procedures, to no avail, 
before disclosing classified information to the media.188    
A third, and more indirect approach, would be to overhaul the 
classification system in the federal government. Even Judge Ellis, a 
conservative judge in the Fourth Circuit, has noted that the federal 
government officials responsible for classifying information “over-classify;” 
that is, when faced with information that might be considered classified, they 
err on the side of categorizing it as classified.189 Indeed, the congressional 
advisory board tasked with assessing this issue recommended an overhaul of 
the current system.190 The current system is a composite of executive orders 
and regulations, and a legislative overhaul is overdue. Part of this overhaul 
should include higher standards for classifying information.191 One of the 
spillover effects of this would be to make it more difficult for administrations 
to use the Espionage Act to target legitimate media reporting.192 This is long 
 
such prosecutions, and yet in the Trump administration there has been an increased focus on 
prosecutions and investigations). Thus, it seems that incremental change is less likely to be 
effective in this area. 
187 See, e.g., Lindsay B. Barnes, The Changing Face of Espionage: Modern Times Call for 
Amending the Espionage Act, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 511, 518–20 (2014) (exploring 
revisions to the intent requirement).  
188 See, e.g., Josh Zeman, “A Slender Reed Upon Which to Rely”: Amending the Espionage 
Act to Protect Whistleblowers, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 149, 165 (2015) (proposing that the 
Espionage Act be amended “to specifically preclude prosecution for those who leak 
information to the media.”). 
189 T. S. Ellis, III, National Security Trials: A Judge’s Perspective, 99 VA. L. REV. 1607, 
1620 (2013). 
190 See PUB. INT. DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ii–iii (2012), https://www.archives.gov/files/ 
declassification/pidb/recommendations/transforming-classification.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3EE-
LEZR] (discussing recommendations pertaining to classification and declassification). 
191 See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 399, 399–401 (2009) (discussing overclassification and the problems it 
creates). 
192 See Anthony L. Fargo, Protecting Journalists' Sources Without A Shield: Four Proposals, 
24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 145, 147 (2019) (proposing that the federal government “[r]ein in the 
out-of-control system for classifying government documents as ‘confidential,’ ‘secret’ or 
‘top secret’ to improve the free flow of information to the public and reduce sources’ 
perceived need to risk prosecution by leaking documents to the press about government 
activities whose disclosure would do no realistic harm to national security.”). 
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overdue, but it was not essential when presidents were not targeting the 
media. At this juncture, it seems prudent to take action to prevent another 
administration from continuing the escalation of prosecutions of journalists 
and the whistleblowers who disclose information to them.193 
 
G. Protect Whistleblowers from Social Media Attacks 
 
It would be impossible in this Article to thoroughly discuss the ways 
in which the current social media system needs to be changed in order to 
effectively curb abuse online. The topic is complex and rapidly changing. 
However, there are a few core concepts from the literature that can help frame 
the issue in the context of whistleblowing.  
 
1. Develop more effective internal rules in social media entities 
 
First, social media platforms need to do a more effective job in 
eliminating speech that threatens whistleblowers. As is nearly universally 
recognized, at the present time, social media platforms do not manage speech 
on their platforms effectively. Speech that is innocuous, such as a newspaper 
posting portions of the Declaration of Independence, is censored, while hate 
speech, including attacks and threats to individuals,194 proliferates.   
Legal scholars have, of course, recognized this problem and proposed 
some solutions.195 As Annemarie Bridy effectively stated: 
[W]e need some ground rules [for social media companies]. 
Practices better than those that platforms currently 
demonstrate in this area include increased definitional clarity 
with respect to categories of prohibited speech, greater 
consistency with respect to content removals, and 
implementation of efficient processes that allow users both 
 
193 See Mark Norris, Comment, Bad “Leaker” or Good “Whistleblower”?—A Test, 64 CASE 
W. RSRV. L. REV. 693, 706–07 (2013) (discussing one approach to balancing the interests of 
government in classifying information and the need to protect whistleblowers). 
194 See supra Part II (discussing examples of threats against whistleblowers in the Trump 
administration). 
195 There have been many approaches suggested on this topic. For additional examples—in 
addition to the ones discussed in the text—see Charlie Warzel, Could Restorative Justice Fix 
the Internet?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/ 
opinion/internet-harassment-restorative-justice.html?searchResultPosition=1 
[https://perma.cc/2AM4-ME7Q] (discussing Lindsay Blackwell’s concept of using 
restorative justice mediation principles); Ethan Baron, Fighting Hate on Facebook, Twitter, 
Youtube: Brittan Heller, E. BAY TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018, 9:54 AM), https://www.east 
baytimes.com/2018/09/27/fighting-hate-on-facebook-twitter-youtube-brittan-heller/ [https:// 
perma.cc/JE8N-8S9U] (explaining Brittan Heller’s suggestion that the way to eliminate 
harassment and hate speech is via changing online social norms). 




to flag potential violations and to contest removals they 
believe are unjustified.196 
Bridy, while not explicitly stating this, appears to suggest that social media 
platforms should be required to undertake these steps in order to retain their 
immunity from legal liability for the speech that occurs on the platforms.197     
Other scholars have been more cautious in suggesting that social media 
platforms should better manage their content. For example, Cindy Cohn argues 
that censoring speech tends to harm those who are less powerful and that it has 
not been effective in the past.198 Thus, she is not enthusiastic about platforms 
engaging in self-censorship because of these risks. Cohn proposes some 
increased filtering by platforms, as well as other changes, such as platforms 
being more transparent about their censorship decisions and developing tools 
for individuals to filter the content they wish or do not wish to see.199  
Another potential approach for social media platforms to follow is 
found in international law. Existing international human rights standards are 
one potential set of standards that social media platforms could use.200 The 
European Union has also set out requirements for social media platforms to 
adhere to in order to eliminate hate speech and harassment. 
Others have suggested that social media platforms not only need to 
better regulate speech; they should also be legally liable for some harmful 
speech on their platforms. Tort liability for these social media providers is one 
such proposal, using existing tort claims such as negligence.201 Another model 
that has been suggested is based off of copyright infringement claims.202 
In short, as part of the need for social media platforms to better 
regulate speech, consideration should be given to protecting whistleblowers 




196 Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 219–20 (2018). 
197 See id. (recommending that social media companies implement clearer, more consistent, 
and more efficient processes). 
198 Cindy Cohn, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: How Platform Censorship Has Failed So Far 
and How to Ensure That the Response to Neo-Nazis Doesn't Make It Worse, 2 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 432, 437–446 (2018). 
199 Id. at 450–51. 
200 See Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 26, 35 (2018) (concluding that speech codes can be based upon international 
human rights standards). 
201 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Jaffe, From Terrorists to Trolls: Expanding Web Host Liability for 
Live-Streaming, Swatting, and Cyberbullying, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 51, 61–62 (2020) 
(proposing a regime of tort liability for web hosts). 
202 Natalia Homchick, Reaching Through the “Ghost Doxer:” An Argument for Imposing 
Secondary Liability on Online Intermediaries, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307, 1333 (2019). 
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2. Expand civil litigation and criminal prosecution of harassers 
 
In addition to changing how social media platforms police their own 
content, the law also has a role to play in combatting harassment of 
whistleblowers. Again, this is an area of the law that cannot effectively be 
covered in a segment of a law review article; it deserves its own full analysis. 
Looming over all lawsuits is the First Amendment.203 Freedom of speech 
does not, however, insulate all speech from liability.204 Working within the 
confines of the First Amendment can still allow effective protection of 
whistleblowers. These potential protections can be separated into two 
components: civil claims and criminal prosecutions. 
There are relatively few criminal prosecutions of those who engage 
in online harassment.205 One of the reasons for this is the relative dearth of 
state laws criminalizing the behavior;206 another is the failure of local police 
to recognize it as within their purview. The federal laws criminalizing cyber 
harassment and cyber stalking also have been underenforced.207 Even if the 
police are willing to investigate, there is a whole host of other issues with 
prosecuting harassers.208 And many statutes fail to criminalize those who 
encourage harassment, 209 which is one manner in which whistleblowers have 
been targeted. A multitude of different approaches have been advocated to 
make criminal law more effective,210 well beyond the scope of this Article to 
 
203 See Danielle Keats Citron, Addressing Cyber Harassment: An Overview of Hate Crimes 
in Cyberspace, 6 CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 8 (2015) (discussing the role of 
the First Amendment). 
204 Id. 
205 See Emma Marshak, Online Harassment: A Legislative Solution, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 503, 
508–17 (2017) (noting that less than 5% of cyber harassment victims report the harassment 
to police and that local police often don’t consider it a crime). 
206 See id. at 514–16 (discussing lack of statutes specifically targeting cyber harassment); id. 
at 517–20 (discussing lack of police response). 
207 Citron, supra note 203, at 5. Between 2012 and 2016, there were only prosecutions of 
forty-one cases of cyberstalking and 280 cases of online threats. Joshua Eaton, Department of 
Justice Turns a Blind Eye to Online Stalking and Abuse, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 18, 2017, 12:21 
PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/exclusive-department-of-justice-fails-to-prosecute-on 
line-stalking-and-abuse-new-data-shows-c82e9cdc21ff/ [https://perma.cc/9QQ5-PC5N]. 
208 See Marshak, supra note 205, at 521–23 (discussing problems identifying the harasser 
and prosecuting them).  
209 See, e.g., Nicolle Parsons-Pollard, Cyberstalking Laws in the United States: Is There a 
Need for Uniformity?, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2010) (discussing need for this coverage). 
210 See, e.g., id. (suggesting changes such as clearly defining harassment and including text 
messaging in the category of cyberstalking behavior); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating 
Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1107 (2011) (suggesting modification 
of current laws, such as revisions to criminal statutes and using civil rights statutes, as well 
as proposing “extra-legal regulatory mechanisms that might better protect individual 
reputations online”); Homchick, supra note 202, at 1315 (recommending imposing criminal 
 




discuss. In general, though, improving the investigation and prosecution of 
online harassment will assist in protecting whistleblowers. 
As for civil litigation, suing those who have engaged in online 
harassment has had mixed results. Civil claims are allowed under the First 
Amendment for harassing/stalking speech in some circumstances.211 For 
instance, the tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been 
suggested as a viable claim in online harassment situations.212 In some 
instances, defamation claims are also viable.213 In addition, there are 
proposals for new statutory claims. One proposal has been to create a new 
statutory claim under federal law where a person is “placed in reasonable fear 
of death or serious bodily injury because of a perpetrator’s actions” by virtue 
of receiving harassing communications via the internet.214 Such a statute 
would do much to potentially benefit whistleblowers subject to such online 




The actions of the Trump administration revealed weaknesses in the 
system of encouraging and protecting whistleblowers. His administration 
targeted whistleblowers directly, by attacking them on social media and in 
 
liability for doxing on the perpetrator, and if that individual is not identifiable, the online 
platform); A. Meena Seralathan, Making the Time Fit the Crime: Clearly Defining Online 
Harassment Crimes and Providing Incentives for Investigating Online Threats in the Digital 
Age, 42 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 425, 432 (2016) (proposing redefining portions of criminal law 
and importing standards for punishment of cyberstalking from other countries); P. Brooks 
Fuller, Mosaic Theory and Cyberharassment: Using Privacy Principles to Clarify the Law 
of Digital Harms and Free Speech, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 309, 315 (2017) (suggesting an 
incremental approach under which “states reconceptualize unprotected harassment as any 
intentional, patterned, persistent course of conduct that places the victim in a state of fear”). 
211 For an excellent overview of the problems of cyber harassment, see Citron, supra note 
203, at 1. 
212 See, e.g., id. at 5; Juan M. Acevedo García, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Torts as the Best Legal Option for Victims: When Cyberbullying Conduct Falls Through the 
Cracks of the U.S. Criminal Law System, 85 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 127, 160–65 (2016) 
(discussing the viability of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a legal claim for 
online harassment). 
213 See, e.g., Heidi Frostestad Kuehl, Free Speech and Defamation in an Era of Social Media: 
An Analysis of Federal and Illinois Norms in the Context of Anonymous Online Defamers, 
36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 28, 30 (2016) (discussing defamation claims for online harassment). 
214 Kara Powell, Cyberstalking: Holding Perpetrators Accountable and Providing Relief for 
Victims, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2019). 
215 Without attorney’s fees, it is unlikely that the recovery of damages would be sufficient to 
induce attorneys to take the case. This would lead to a situation where only wealthy 
individuals can afford to take action to stop online harassment. For federal employees, who 
tend to earn less than their private sector counterparts, an attorney’s fees award is essential 
for such a statute to provide meaningful relief.    
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the news as well as by firing them, removing them from their jobs, and 
ramping up criminal investigations into leaks within the federal 
government.216 The Trump administration also targeted whistleblowers 
indirectly, by failing to adequately support or fund existing whistleblower 
protection resources and by refusing to enact policies to expand 
whistleblower protections.217 The cumulative effect of this has been to 
fundamentally change the culture of the federal government so that 
whistleblowers have been discouraged and ceased disclosing wrongdoing. 
This undermines the legislative work that Congress has done to improve 
whistleblower protections over the years.218 Congress needs to shore up and 
expand whistleblower protections in order to prevent a continued reduction 
in whistleblower disclosures by federal employees as well as to take action 
to prevent or limit retaliation against them.    
 
 
216 See supra Sections II.A–C. 
217 See supra Section II.D. 
218 See supra Section I.A. 
